The Arab Peace Initiative and the International Community:
Towards concerted efforts for its implementation
Walid Salem is director of the Center for Democracy and Community Development
and a lecturer at Al-Quds University.
With the ongoing stalemate on the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral track, all who are
actively seeking peace still see the Arab Peace Initiative as a potential point of
departure for breaking the impasse, subject to the Israeli Governmens readiness to
accept the API as a basis for discussion. The French UNSC Resolution draft refers to
the API, reports say that the United States may be developing a new API based plan
for peace, and the EU has shown interest on many occasions in moving in that
direction. Many Israeli parties developed API based plans for peace such as MK
Yaacov Peri (Yesh Atid), the Zionist Camp, Meretz and others. Even Foreign
Minister Avigdor Lieberman wants to twist the APIs neck and use it against its
content by wishing to have normal relations with the Arab countries without
withdrawing from the Palestinian and the Arab occupied territories in 1967.
Some have suggested a UN and Quartet led international conference based on the
API, while others suggest a U.S. led process in coordination with Egypt and Jordan, a
third group suggests a gradual Arab normalization track with Israel parallel to the
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and a fourth group thought that the Arab role should
be supportive, by bringing Jordan and Egypt to play a direct role in the Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations by either being present in the negotiations room as one version
suggests or by supporting the two sides from outside the negotiations room as another
version suggest. Different proposals were also presented about the expected role of
the Gulf countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular in the process. Some have
proposed implementation of the API as a point of departure for the establishment of
an Arab-Israeli coalition against Iran, forgetting that the API was approved by the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation at their meeting in Tehran in 2003, and that the
API is an initiative that has the consensus of all the Arab and Islamic countries on it,
and therefore it is against its internal logic to call for its implementation in order to
create a pact of the so called moderates against the extremists.
In the last few months, due to the continuing impasse, the proposals about the API
have started to focus on developing a new UNSC resolution that is based on the API
that some say should be an alternative to Resolution 242.
All these proposals indicate that the API initiative is facing a new context that
requires it to have new functions.
The API and its mechanisms
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 is becoming well known, including to 65 percent of
the Israelis according to a public opinion poll in February 2015. It represents
a departure from the traditional Arab position regarding Israel (no peace, no
recognition and no negotiation) into ayes with both recognition and normalized
relations if Israel withdraws from the Arab and the Palestinian Territories occupied in
1967 and accepts an agreed upon solution to the Palestinian refugees problem in
accordance with the UNGA Resolution 194.
The Arab Peace Initiative was initially introduced by his Royal Highness Prince
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and
approved by the 2002 Arab Summit held in Beirut.
The main significance of the API is that it is an initiative that represents the consensus
of all the 22 Arab countries (and subsequently all 57 Islamic countries) making it a
plan of all Arab countries and not only so-calledmoderate Arab countri. Therefore
the Israeli acceptance of the API would lead to a comprehensive peace with all the
Arab (and Islamic) countries regardless of their ideological differences.
Beyond this, the API has a second international significance, since it has been
confirmed by UN Security Council resolutions 1850 and 1860 in 2008 and 2009. It
was mentioned in the Quartet Performance based Road Map of 2003, and later on in
all the Quartet statements and the EU statement, thus becoming an international, Arab
and Islamic plan presented to Israel, and not only an Arab plan. Therefore the
international community is not less responsible according to its own decisions for the
promotion and the implementation of the API.
The third significance of the API which is less known is that the Arab League
has created mechanisms for its promotion and implementation that the international
community can cooperate with when deciding to work intensively on API
implementation. These two mechanisms are: 1) Jordan and Egypt were delegated by
the Arab League to represent the API with Israel, and 2) an Arab Peace Initiative
follow up committee was created and delegated with the task of representing the API
with the international community. This committee is chaired on a rotating basis by the
Arab country that chairs the Arab League. This year Egypt is the chair of that
committee, since the last Arab summit was held in Egypt on March 28 – 29, 2015.
The March summit in Sharm A-Sheikh, Egypt added a third mechanism, a committee
that includes Egypt( the current President of the Arab summit), Jordan ( the Arab
Representative in the UNSC), Morocco (the President of the 2016 forthcoming
summit), the General Secretary of the Arab League Dr Nabil Al Arabi and Palestine.
This new committee was delegated with the task of elevating Palestine in the UN. The
committee met on April 6th in Cairo and decided to go to the UNSC with an Arab
draft resolution that calls under the API umbrella for the end of the Israeli occupation
of the Palestinian occupied territories within a restricted time frame. This decision is
an echo of the Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs call during their meeting in Cairo on
March 10th, and the call by King Salman Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia at the Arab
Summit of March 2015, King Salman called also on the UN to appoint a new UN
special envoy that will work for the implementation of the new UNSC and API based
resolution. The Arabs expect that the mechanisms decided by them will be respected.
Therefore nobody should offend Saudi Arabia by asking it to communicate or
negotiate the API officially with Israel when the Arabs designated Jordan and Egypt
for this task.
The final significance of the API is represented by its steadfast, despite all the chaos
in the region. The new emerging regimes in Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and others have
accepted it, the mechanisms that were developed by the Arab League are still in place,
and have even became more active with the API becoming an international plan.
The primary role of the API in the Israeli-Palestinian context today is to elevate
Palestine to a better symmetrical position with Israel as a way to pressure the Israeli
government to move, by using both diplomatic tools such as enabling Palestine to
become a member state in the UN, a new UN Security Council resolution and other
international mechanisms, while building Palestinian facts on the ground via
concerted international and Arab efforts mainly in East Jerusalem and area C, and the
reconstruction of Gaza.
Stages for Implementation of the API
The starting point is a new UNSC resolution that will include and be followed by
an implementation of the API that will lead the Israeli-Palestinian track to the
establishment of two states living side by side in peace and security- through the
following stages:
1) A strong engagement by the United States and the other Quartet parties with the
new Israel government is a must in order to formulate terms with the Israel Prime
Minister about what he will present later on at the negotiating table, and whether
this will meet the minimum requirements of the Palestinians.
During this pre-negotiation engagement, the Israeli Prime Minister should also be
advised not to demand Palestinian recognition of Israel as aJewish State or as
a State of Jewish People as long as he does not clearly define its borders; does not
recognize dividing Jerusalem as a city of two capitals for two states; and as long as he
does not assure the status of the Palestinians of Israel as Israelis citizens so as not to
transfer them nor their residency area to the Palestinian state. The Prime Minister
should also be advised that this process, being based on the API, will lead to the
creation of normal relations between Israel and the Arab and Islamic countries.
Parallel to engagement with the Israeli Government, the Quartet should have an
intensive engagement with the Arab League, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine in order to
draft together the content of the new UNSC resolution in order to develop it in a
manner that will make it acceptable to the Palestinian leadership. Developing only a
series of vague parameters or overall principles in a new UNSC resolution will be
counterproductive, as previous experiences have shown. After 25 years of
negotiations since 1990, the Arabs and Palestinians will not accept less than a clear
cut resolution that includes a time table for getting to the two-state solution that will
include also tools and procedures to be used against the party that fails to fulfill its
obligations according to the resolution.
Based on these preparations, the Quartet should prepare memorandums of
understandings to be presented to the parties prior to the resumption of the
negotiations.
Without such a preparatory stage, it will be a disaster and a recipe for failure
of the negotiations.
2) Once the initial stage is completed, the international community will call on the
two sides to engage in negotiations on the permanent status issues, starting with a
launching of an international conference. The conference will be attended by the
Quartet countries, the Arab League, core Arab countries, Israel, the BRICS countries,
and representatives from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The conference
will decide the parameters for upcoming negotiations on the basis of the new UNSC
resolution, and will accordingly set up an international Follow-Up Committee for the
bi-lateral negotiations. The Committee will intervene in the negotiations when needed
to bring in bridging proposals. Such a committee could include the U.S., the EU,
some EU countries like France, Germany, and the UK, BRICS, Russia, the Arab
League, and Arab countries mainly Jordan and Egypt.
Factors to be taken into consideration in the negotiations
1. The negotiations will be on all the permanent status issues between the two sides
without exclusion;
2. The previously agreed on issues between President Abbas and Prime
Minister Olmert will be recognized and will not be the subject of renegotiation, but
will be presented in order to go hand in hand with the implementation plans of what is
agreed upon about them;
3. The negotiations should not be gradual but based on a time table and benchmarks;
4. The negotiations should aim to the establishment of a Palestinian state, on the 1967
borders, that lives in peace and security with Israel and also an agreement on a just
solution for the Palestinian refugee problem;
5. Negotiations should be directed by the Quartet, in coordination with the Arab
League, and the relevant Arab countries in order to push the implementation of the
API forward in the Israeli- Palestinian track. Coordination with different international
blocs such as BRICS, will be necessary in order to move the process forward in
addition to the revival of some of the multilateral working groups.
Unilateral steps to be taken by Israel
6. Steps to be taken unilaterally by Israel during the negotiation time, in order to build
confidence in the process and to fulfill the previous agreement obligations, including:
i. Allowing the return of all 1967 displaced persons to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem;
ii. Allowing the free access of goods and individuals between the West Bank, Gaza
and East Jerusalem;
iii. Freezing the settlement expansion, dismantling settlements outposts, and allowing
the Palestinian building and development processes in Area C of the West Bank and
East Jerusalem;
iv. Reopening the closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem;
v. Releasing the Palestinian prisoners;
vi. Avoiding any incursions into the Palestinian territories;
vii. Allowing for rebuilding Gaza.
What the Quartet/International Community should do
The other steps to be taken by the Quartet/International Community during the
negotiations include:
1. Supporting the Palestinian development projects in Area C, East Jerusalem and
Gaza;
2. Monitoring the Israeli restrictions and violations in Area C, East Jerusalem, and the
freedom of movement between the West Bank and Gaza, and
taking action against these violations;
3. Lifting the veto against Palestinian internal reconciliation and supporting
the holding of Palestinian National Council, Palestinian Presidency and Palestinian
Legislative Council elections in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and with
the Palestinian all over the world for the Palestinian National Council elections;
4. Supporting the Palestinian Authority finances, and the PA project, while
also preventing Israel from stopping the transfer of the Palestinian Tax revenues
collected in Israel;
5. Ensuring the Israeli commitment toward all its obligations according to the
previous agreements between the parties;
6. Boycotting the Israel settlements products, and avoid investing in those
settlements.
Alternative Plan
If the International Community fails to get the new Israeli government to accept the
minimum position required for the resumption of the negotiations, then the
International Community should present a Plan B consisting of an international plan
toward the two states solution, with a timetable and benchmarks to be met by both
parties, and to follow the implementation of that plan with the sides using the
economic, technological and other means of support existing as carrots and sticks to
move the process forward.
These moves to be also accomplished by:
1. Supporting the Palestinian initiative toward the elevation of the status of the State
of Palestine to become a member state in the United Nations, and the creation of an
international coalition of all the countries who voted in favor of accepting Palestine as
a non -member state in the UN, to work toward the full Palestinian membership in the
UN;
2. Creating systematic cooperation between the EU and the Arab League, based on
the articles and principles of the 13th of November 2012, Cairo Declaration from the
Cairo meeting of the Arab and European Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the one
that followed in Athens in 2014, and working accordingly with a joint plan for the
implementation of the API toward the achievement of a Comprehensive Middle-
Eastern Peace;
3. Supporting the Palestinian non-violent struggle against the occupation, and
promoting the Israeli, Arab and International peace camp and solidarity organizations
participation in it.
Recognition of a Palestinian state would create a more level playing field
The API cannot be used to encourage Arab countries to assert pressure on the
Palestinians to make compromises. President Abbas and the Palestinian leadership
have already made all the concessions needed, yet the response by Israel has been
more settlement expansion and more extremist positions in contradiction to any
agreement with the Palestinian leadership. Israel up till now has not officially
responded to the Initiative. It sees the API proposal as yet another way to delegitimize
Israel. The issue of the Palestinian refugees has been a central justification used for
this non-response, despite the fact that the API refers to an agreed upon solution to
the refugee problem.
Therefore pressure connected to the API should be placed only on Israel to accept
it. This is the time for an international API based plan for a two-state solution based
on the 1967 borders that will be achieved with or without any further negotiations
between the parties. This requires a tough international hand on the Israeli occupiers,
starting from a clear cut new UNSC resolution for ending occupation, combined with
a clear cut tools and procedures that will be used in order to make it possible to
achieve the goal.
Walid Salem- April 2015
Contact: +972-2-628-1151 / walidsociety@gmail.com / cd@cd-cd.org /
www.cd-cd.org / www.theapiregionalnetwork.net
